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INTRODUCTION
In August 1991 a Committee for State Emergencies, consisting of the minister of
defence and the chief of the KGB, ousted Mikhail Gorbachev from power in the Soviet
Union. The coup was important for several reasons. The platoons of tanks that moved in
Moscow's streets ended a long tradition of obedience by the Soviet military to the civilian
Communist Party. In addition, the military coup also marked a decisive shift in the
foundation of civilian control in the Soviet Union.
By analysing Soviet civil-military relations before the coup, this essay tries to
determine how the military became involved in the coup. The essay then seeks to determine
whether different theoretical frameworks, mostly based on American experience, could
explain the breakdown of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union.
SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM LENIN TO KHRUSCHEV
The first Soviet government came to power in what was essentially an urban strike
against the Tsarist state. There were tense civil-military relations at first, not because of the
nature of military professionalism, but because of no unquestioned political loyalty among the
amalgamated military at the outset.!)
The first Soviet governments addressed the potential conflict with the military by
neutralizing political opposition and by bringing pressure to bear on the military to internalize
the Communist Party's value system. During this period a system of control through
surveillance, ideological controls and a dual structure of authority predominated. Control was
exercised through the Main Political Administration(MPA) and military informer networks of
the political intelligence organization.2)
After the Second World War the civilian leadership concluded that the military was
supportive of the government under most conditions and political pressure on the military
receded. Albright links this tendency to the late Stalin era.3) However, the action of Soviet
leader Nikita Khrushchev against the defence minister, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, in the late
fifties, after the latter weakened the MPA's influence in the military, suggests a later date.
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After Khrushchev the military lobbied actively for !,'J"eaterautonomy and for
insulation from haphazard political interference. The era of Leonid Brezhnev saw the party-
political apparatus in the military largely identifying with the military and turning its attention
to helping military officers carry out their basic missionA)
THE BREZHNEV ERA
Under Brezhnev the military was given a high degree of autonomy regarding most
military matters, even as prime formulators of policy options for political leaders on issues
with military dimensions.5) During the Brezhnev era there was also a great convergence of
civilian and military leaders' values, emphasizing the unity of the Soviet state, a strong
defense against external threats, superpower status and internal order.
The civilian and military leaders shared many values and had a similar social and
political background, strengthened by organized socialization and politicization in the
communist state. While less than ten percent of civilians were party members, more than
seventy percent of officers were party members during the Brezhnev era.6)
In fact, the complex network of roles in which important military men were
simultaneously senior party officials complicates the application of the concepts "civilian"
and "military" here. Military reservations with some civilian policies were often shared with
important segments of the party machine. The civilian party gave priority to developing
military capabilities primarily because such capability advanced the party's own goals,
including self-preservation.7)
The civilian party leaders and the military therefore made the system work by being
responsive to each other. In the Soviet Union the only interests with power were those
represented in the Communist Party and bureaucracies, and policy was made in a bureaucratic
competition. In the absence of many civilian security experts, the military had a virtual
monopoly on expertise, information and option formation.8)
The military's near-monopoly meant that the military also influenced the defence
policy agenda. Military leaders tried to design military strategy to protect the essential core
missions of their institutions, even when those institutional interests conflicted with defence
policy as established by civilian leaders. Since civilian decisions were mostly made after
compromises and concessions, the military frequently succeeded in defying the exact
requirements of civilian policy.
The prerequisites for a civilian ability to force policy integration were a bureaucratic
coalition in favour of the policy change and an effective policy handle. A policy handle is a
way to redefine the nature of a policy decision and force change on a subordinate organization
by removing the policy decision from the organization's exclusive area of expertise.9)
Where the party leadership, for whatever reason, chose to focus on an issue like
nuclear arms policy, it could force change. The military autonomy was not so strong that the
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civilian party was isolated completely from matters of strategy.
At the same time, the more autonomous top military leadership benefited materially
from the relatively high priority accorded the military in society. The military could also
build up substantial forces. In so far as the military was involved in politics, it was
predominantly involved in bureaucratic politics.
However, the military influence remained within the established one party-dominated
framework. There was a deep-seated consensus in the civilian party organs after Stalin
against any pronounced upgrading of military influence. The military's influence remained
limited, also in the short period between Brezhnev and Gorbachev. 10)
THE WEAKENING OF MILITARY AUTONOMY UNDER GORBACHEV
General secretaries of the Communist Party have played a critical role in deciding
how permeable the borders of'military autonomy have been. Mikhail Gorbachev was no
exception and his policy of restructuring or perestroika considerably changed civil-military
relations in the Soviet Union.
When Gorbachev came to power his aim was clearly economic revitalization. One of
several constraining forces was the defense agenda. The problem was less the resources that
were already going to the military, than the future resource commitments implied by threat
assessments and requirements derived from traditional security thinking. Gaining control of
the defense agenda was a necessity for Gorbachev's policy success. I I)
Previously secrecy and a near-monopoly on military expertise had locked other
institutional actors out of the defence policy process. However, Gorbachev turned for new
ideas to non-military professionals in academia, party staff and the ministry of foreign affairs.
These new actors found themselves in a competition among themselves and with the military
bureaucracy to influence policy.12)
Non-military influences on policy regarding conventional force planning cut to the
heart of military autonomy and professionalism, and the unilateral Soviet force and budget
reductions which followed therefore inflamed the military's institutional ire. A hardening of
professional attitudes among military leaders against military reforms were noticed months
before the coup.13)
THE FRAGMENTATION AND POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY
As defence allocations were being cut, the military leadership was especially worried
about saving high-priced weapons programs.14) However, the poor living and working
conditions of the junior officer corps received little attention. Tens of thousands of officers
and their families were without minimal housing, but the junior officers remained
unsuccessful in getting the issue on the military agenda. This situation created potential lines
of fragmentation in the Soviet military. IS)
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The professional and generational divisions in the military were reinforced by public
criticism of the military and internal political polarization. During the late 1980s there were
strong anti-military currents in Soviet society, dating back to the Afghan war experience and
society's rejection of the war's veterans. Media sensationalism about the expensiveness of
military power in the economically-stricken Union and military maltreatment of conscripts
led to severe public criticism of the military. 16)
The military, attacked from many sides. was motivated to publicly speak out on
issues of professional concern and in institutional defence. The military was drawn into
public debates on more and more issues. No steps were taken to prevent officers from
expressing their personal political opinions in the press or from becoming members of
political organizations.
To the senior military the Communist Party remained a solid supporter, while other
political forces were attacking the institutional interests of the military. The declining civilian
interest in the Communist Party also offered new opportunities for senior officers' activism
and influence within the party.
In contrast, the junior officers saw that party membership, previously a requisite for a
top career, would not be career-enhancing any more, but that membership of other reformist
or nationalist movements may be career-enhancing in the politicized environment. Lower-
ranking officers could outflank the military chain of command and establish an independent
power base from which to press their professional and political agendas. 17)
THE DECLINE IN CIVILIAN AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY
The fragmentation and politicization of the military occurred in a society where the
authority of the Communist Party was declining. Gorbachev's attempts to replace the one
party-dominated political system with one based on democratically-elected legislatures did
not effectively transfer power to a presidential central authority.
The bureaucratic system holding together regions of diverse resources, cultures, clans
and religions, was weakened. This power vacuum allowed republican leaders to demand a
greater role in policy-making. Some republics started to pass laws to void union laws. A
contest of power erupted which undermined the center's perceived competence, authority and
power.J8)
The rise of political institutions at many levels of government provided opportunities
for overt political activism by military officers in the nascent domestic political process,
including direct interaction with civilian politicians. The contest of power between the central
authority and the republics, and domestic military missions to establish order, also amplified
the politicizing impact of nationalist movements on the conscript pool. 19)
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The decay of other major institutions of the central authority, like the Communist
Party apparatus, left the military as one of the weakened but comparatively strong central
institutions. Consequently, as part of their contest with the central authority, many republics
tried to restrict the central Soviet military by new laws.
THE CHALLENGE TO CORE MILITARY VALVES AND INTERESTS
The long-term threat of republican challenges to the center constituted a great threat
to the centrally controlled Soviet military. Some republics started preparations to suspend
central conscription and the deployment of republican nationals by the central military. Local
support to central military installations was cut off and several military bases closed down by
republican govemments.20)
The republican assertiveness presented an organized political threat to the military's
institutional prerogatives. The military leadership was discontent with the way the civilian
party leadership was reacting to the escalating challenges to central authority and the Soviet
military institution. Gorbachev's planned Union Treaty of 20 August would acknowledge
power-sharing with the republics, and was seen as a further step in a process threatening the
Soviet military institution.
Apart from such discontent, there was also officer discontent against the senior
military command, which had proved itself incapable of addressing the concerns of the junior
officer corps. The senior military therefore presided over a moderately pro-centralist but
divided officer corps and a republican-orientated conscript army. The divided officer corps
could not be mobilized on the national level and could not act as a coherent political force.2l)
At the same time that several interests in the KGB, the military, the defence industry
and the central bureaucracy were threatened, Gorbachev himself had an increasingly weak
power base in the party. Opposition to Gorbachev's leadership crystallized during the so-
called "constitutional coup" of June 1991, when prime minister Pavlov attempted to usurp
many of Gorbachev's presidential powers. The attempt had the support of the minister of
defence, Yazov and the head of the KGB, Kruychov. Gorbachev defeated the attempt, but
did not act against the dissident group.22).
By August 1991 the heads of the increasingly powerful republics, including the
elected leader of the Russian republic, Boris Yeltsin, wanted the removal of the minister of
defence and the head of the KGB. At the same time, the military senior command faced the
possible removal of Communist Party structures from the military and the KGB in the
Russian republic. There was also a 50% decline in new orders to the defence industries and
the possibility of another reformist split in the Communist Party.23)
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THE OPAQUE ROLE OF GORBACHEV
Instead of trying to consolidate the Communist Party or to broaden his tenuous
support for the Union treaty before the planned signing on 20 August 1991, Gorbachev and
his family took a fortnight's holiday. The holiday started on 4 August and was far away from
the power center. This behaviour was out of keeping and could also suggest that Gorbachev
was leaving the field expressly to others.24)
Gorbachev has claimed that he was without communications during the coup and
blockaded at his house. There are several contrary indications, however. The coup organizers
were Gorbachev's men. He opened the way for Kryuchkov in the KGB, for Pavlov as prime
minister, for Pugo as minister of the interior, for Yanayev as vice-president and for Yazov as
minister of defence. They were all part of Gorbachev's immediate circle and of the eight man
State Committee for State Emergencies which organized the coup.25)
On 18August some of them went to see him in the Crimea, to gain his permission for
a state of emergency. When the coup started to unravel on 21 August, they again tried to gain
his support for such a measure. During Gorbachev's flight back to Moscow, he at first did not
want to arrest Kryuchkov and defended the army chief of staff and coup supporter Moiseev.
Gorbachev's conduct suggests that he either had :In agreement with the coup organizers or
thought that he could control them again through manipulation
The coup organizers included competent professionals like Kryuchkov and Yazov,
and yet the coup was not well orchestrated. The coup organizers said afterwards that they
were convinced that they could persuade Gorbachev to remain incommunicado while they
tried to implement a state of emergency. Gorbachev's account of the conversations with the
plotters supports their account.26)
As Pryce-Jones and others have stated, Gorbachev's style was often obllque, "
matter of nods and hints".27) The coup plotters already had all the power they could possibly
want in the key positions. The possibility cannot be excluded that, as Yeltsin initially thought
and as the plotters allege, Gorbachev in his projections of a state of emergency hinted that he
was aware of the plotters' plans for a state of emergency and that he would back success but
disavow failure.
Gorbachev would have benefited from a centralist crackdown on the national
republican forces without having to sully his international reputation. After a successful
stabilization led by security bureaucrats he would probably have been able to enter politics
again. On the other hand, his conduct could be explained by a risky strategy to manipulate
his assembled centralist team to ward off democratic and republican forces while
implementing reformed communism.28)
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THE COUP OF AUGUST 1991
However, Gorbachev's main team, driven by the KGB leader Kryuchov, was not
completely under his control. On 19 August 1991, the State Committee for State
Emergencies, hereafter referred to as the Committee, announced a state of emergency in
Gorbachev's absence. Military forces were deployed in Moscow and elsewhere and
Gorbachev was visited by a delegation of the coup organizers.
Gorbachev refused to agree to a state of emergency to stop the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. However, he did not detain the Committee delegation, although he had armed
guards at his disposal. In his memoirs Gorbachev says that he expected the coup participants
to come to their senses after his refusal, and that it was not the first time that he had restrained
them from rash action.29)
The coup enjoyed the support of the majority in the Secretariat of the Communist
Party's Central Committee, which was Gorbachev's power base. Polls conducted eventually
showed that about 40 percent of the population sympathised with the coup and 70 percent of
the regional party leadership.30)
However, most of the population remained passive during the coup. Under
Gorbachev's rule, there had emerged civil society leaders but only the business community,
who stood to lose if reforms were dismantled: so they quickly denounced the coup.3l) The
coup organizers wanted to shock Moscow's population into submission with an enormous
display of faceless decrees, military hardware and ordinary soldiers.
However, there was no rapid neutralization of potential oppositIOn leaders like
Yeltsin. He went to the White House building in Moscow to defy the authority of the
centralist Committee with his authority as elected leader of the Russian republic.
Communication media remained available to him to mobilize support, also internationally. A
big crowd of supporters, including many Russian youths and some Afghan war veterans,
eventually assembled around the building, forming a human shield.
The coup organizers wanted to maintain good foreign relations and therefore wanted
to avoid bloodshed. When Yeltsin, as elected Russian leader, succeeded in establishing a
counter-pole of legitimacy, his arrest could provoke a sharp backlash of resistance, possibly
leading to excessive force and bloodshed. Kryuchkov, according to some analysts, wante<!to
avoid such a possibility. Other analysts maintain that Kryuchkov continued to manoeuver
hopes of capturing Yeltsin.32)
The middle-aged coup plotters may have underestimated the extent of the
communication media in the information age. Instead of a quiet and inconspicuous coup in
the corridors of power, they suddenly had a totally public issue in the full glare of publicity.
The Committee did not have any internal or external leader, or an experienced media
spokesperson. Not unexpectedly, the media appearances of the Committee members did not
strengthen the public's perceptions about the Committee's legitimacy.33)
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THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE COUP
When the Committee ousted Gorbachev and announced a state of emergency,
virtually all of the top commanders, in spite of reservations, complied with the Committee's
orders. While mil italY commanders at all levels were willing to deploy forces, most balked
when it came to employing the forces against those resisting the coup. Yeltsin and most of
his supporters were ethnic Russians, like most Soviet military officers and 80 percent of the
Soviet army.34)
The senior military command had three choices, to resist the strike against the state,
to participate in the coup, or to stand aloof. The senior command could resist the coup, but it
shared the concerns of the Committee. The senior command and the Committee agreed about
the need to reassert central authority, to reign in republican govemments, to re-establish law
and order in society, and to bolster the declining prestige and influence of the military.
Alternatively, the senior command could support the Committee. However, to employ
forces against those resisting the coup, risked igniting volatile political forces among the
ranks. The senior command perceived a real potential for the complete disintegration of the
Soviet military in such a case.35) As it turned out, the potential for intra-military clashes
between units which repositioned themselves, did develop.
If the senior command did not want to actively resist or support the Committee, it
could have chosen to stand aloof and allow the effort to re-establish central authority to fail.
The risk of such a course of action involved the prospects that the Union could unravel
haphazardly, resulting in the collapse of the central military establishment.
Eventually, the senior command fractured into three groups, with the majority
standing aloof. There was no clear mission, no obvious enemy and no charismatic leadership
for the military supporters of the coup. In addition, the coup's supporters were mixed in units
with coup opponents, which immobilized the military.
The MPA and the KGB were more willing to support the coup than the regular
military, but lacked the ability to push military commanders into action.36) However, the
coup was probably doomed by the reluctance of the Russian centralist senior command
members to employ forces against those resisting the coup, including Russian civilians
assembled outside Yeltsin's White House. When the order was at last given to special troops
to storm the White House, the unit to which the mission was assigned refused to obey.37)
There was no clear source of civilian control over the politicized and divided military
during the coup. When elected Russian president Yeltsin declared that he was assuming
control of security forces in Russia, this provided a strong alternative base of civilian
authority in the capital and strongest republic of the Soviet Union.
During the contest over legitimacy the coup Committee failed to persuade the public
that it was a legitimate authority. After three days, the coup Committee agreed to withdraw
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troops and Gorbachev was re-instated. However, Gorbachev never fully recovered his
authority. The strike against the state, conducted to save the centralist Soviet Union,
probably hastened the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.
THE SEPARATION APPROACH IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT
The breakdown in late Soviet civil-military relations and the coup can also be
assessed with reference to existing perspectives on civil-military relations. One approach,
followed by Samuel Huntington, stresses the separation between the military and civilian
institutions.38)
Good civil-military relations, in Huntington's view, require a separation of civilian
and military spheres, with civilians determining policy and the military implementing it. The
separation approach is, however, based on American experience. While this approach implies
a conflict between liberal democratic civilian authorities and the military, because of the
conservative realist values in military professionalism, Soviet civil-military relations initially
were not tense because of the nature of military professionalism.
Soviet civil-military relations were tense initially because the Communist Party rulers
could not depend on the political loyalty of the diverse amalgamated military. A system was
introduced in which the power of one civilian group, the Communist Party, was maximised in
relation to the military and other civilian groups, by penetrating the military with civilian
political values and interests. The means of penetration included the division of the officer
corps into competing groups, ideological controls by the MPA and a dual structure of
authority.39)
Samuel Huntington described this system as one of subjective control. Roman
Kolkowicz argues that the Soviet system remained a dominantly subjective one. In contrast,
Timothy Colton argues that the Soviet military was eventually under so-called objective
control, with substantial autonomy from the civilian authorities and controlled by a self-
restraining professionalism from involvement in partisan politics.40)
The subjective model implies that civilians will seek to enlist the military in a
winning coalition during periods of succession, with a resulting growth in military influence.
However, during the succession period of Mikhail Gorbachev the military had a weqk
influence only. This seems to indicate that subjective civilian control was not dominant
during the late Soviet Union.
The Brezhnev era's predominant control through a self-restraining military
professionalism was allowed because of the effectiveness of previous subjective control. The
military's interests and values were compatible with those of the civilian party and there was
little threat of military involvement in partisan politics.4I)
Soviet civil-military relations therefore were along a continuum of both conflict and
cooperation during the Brezhnev era, but mostly cooperative. This situation contrasts with
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Huntington's approach, based on a multi-party democracy, that civil-military relations are
inherently conflictual. In addition, while Huntington stressed that civilian authority and the
military constitute two distinct groups, the Soviet example indicates an overlap in roles and
personnel, also in the defence industry.
While the late Soviet system mostly did not involve a subjective control of the
military, there was at most an incomplete objective control of the military in the late Soviet
Union. The tasks of the MPA still included some elements of subjective control.42) After
Gorbachev's reforms, several civilian groups, including the Communist Party, reformist
groups and nationalist movements, also started to compete for influence in the military.
The centralist military's objective control depended on a self-restraining
professionalism, and such professionalism depended on the military viewing itself as serving
Soviet society. When the political developments and debates in society increasingly put the
existence of such a society in question, the basis of Soviet military professionalism started to
weaken.
The weakening of a self-restraining military professionalism did coincide with the
military intervention in partisan politics, as Huntington's approach would suggest. However,
the military intervention was not organized against the remaining institutions of subjective
civilian control. In the Soviet case the coup was driven by the KGB and supported by the
MPA, both institutions supposed to ensure civilian control.
Also, it can be argued that the predominantly self-restraining and autonomous
military of the Brezhnev era served to desensitize the men who formed the leadership of the
late Soviet military. The senior military command, committed to the professional defence of
a centralist Soviet Union, may have misjudged the political currents and the discourses of
different nationalisms and democracy.43)
The separation of the military and a self-restraining military professionalism may
therefore have contributed to military intervention, rather than preventing such intervention.
While Huntington's approach provides some analytical tools, it does not necessarily explain
the breakdown in Soviet civil-military relations.
THE INTEGRATION APPROACH IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT
Huntington's approach emphasizes the separation of the military and civilian
institutions as a means to stable civil-military relations. In contrast, a second theoretical
approach stresses the close link between the military and society, and indicates that the
military can never be completely separate from society.
According to this approach, followed by Morris Janowitz, the military will reflect
society in important ways and social currents will find their way into the military at some
stage.44) For stable civil-military relations, similar social backgrounds for civilian
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institutions and the military, as well as a meaningful integration between civilian and military
values are suggested.
Thc occasionally unstable civil-military relations during the initial years of the Soviet
Union, as well as the stable relations during the Brezhnev era, can be explained by this
approach. The intense debates during the Gorbachev era in Soviet society on the role of the
military indicated some conflict between civilian and military values, regarding the military
budget, domestic involvement, training and the Afghan war.45)
The criticism of the military by different civilian actors and uorbacnev's weakening
of military autonomy and influence did cause tense civil-military relations. On the other
hand, it can also be argued that the contest of values in society was merely reflected in the
divided military too, so that the coup was not the result of a lack of integration between
civilian and military values as such. However, the coup organizers shared the social
backgrounds and values of the dominant centralist faction in the ruling civilian Communist
Party.
Not only the strongest party faction, but also Gorbachev aimed at the retention of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet coup leadership was also predominantly Russian, and the strongest
civilian opposition to the deployment of the military forces was predominantly Russian.
These similarities may have affected the willingness to use certain means during the coup, but
they did not ensure stable civil-military relations.
The coup therefore was not the result of a lack of integration between civilian and
military values as such. The contest of values and interests in Soviet society was in fact
reflected in the divided military too. The integration approach therefore does not explain the
breakdown in Soviet civil-military relations.
THE CONCORDANCE APPROACH IN THE SOVIET CONTEXT
Apart from the separation and integration approaches, Rebecca Schiff also tries to
explain civil-military relations according to a so-called concordance or agreement
approach.46) She sees separation or integration of civilians and the military as one of several
possibilities for stable civil-military relations.
For Schiff, the specific kind of civil-military relationship is less important to deter
military intervention in partisan politics than the degree of agreement between the political
elites, the military and the citizenry. Schiff mentions four areas where agreement is
necessary: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process,
the method for recruiting the rank and file of the military, and also military style.47)
Applying the concordance approach in the case of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev
may be difficult. In the absence of free multi-party elections, it is difficult to determine what
the true values and the degree of consent of the civilian population were. Some analysts
argue that eventually a subjective acceptance of Soviet identity went alongside a sense of
Scientia Militaria - 29 1999 II
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 29, 1999. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
specific national consciousness,48) At the same time, coercion and propaganda played an
important role in establishing and maintaining the Soviet Union.
The centralist Soviet Union had to accommodate hundreds of nationalities in the
different member republics. The political accommodation of nationalities, exploited also by
local elites trying to get access or to maintain access to resources, fuelled disagreement
among the citizenry, military and civilian leaders during Gorbachev's rule,49)
The contest between the center and the republics, the challenge to military values and
interests, and social criticism of the military institution were directly related to the
composition of the officer corps, the pattern of military recruitment, military style and the
political decision-making process. Disagreement on the four areas mentioned by Schiff was
therefore present during the breakdown in Soviet civil-military relations. The concordance
approach does provide a plausible explanation for the collapse of Soviet civil-military
relations.
CONCLUSION
The Communist Party was the main source of civilian control of the Soviet military.
Strong measures to ensure control through specific political values in the amalgamated
military characterized initial civil-military relations. As the civilian Communist Party and
military elites came to share values, social backgrounds and interests, greater military
autonomy and self-control characterized civil-military relations. However, the Gorbachev era
again saw greater tension in civil-military relations.
Gorbachev's reforms were followed by less military autonomy, the growing
fragmentation and politicization of the military, a decline in the influence of the central
civilian authority and threats to core military values and interests. An alliance of threatened
individuals and interest groups, also from the military and the Communist party, launched a
coup d'etat under KGB command.
The coup organizers aimed to re-establish the authority of the Communist Party in a
centralist Soviet Union. Gorbachev's conduct suggests that he either was willing to allow the
coup organizers, his close associates, to proceed in case they could weaken his opponents at
no cost to himself, or that he miscalculated his ability to control the centralist forces in his
government. However, the main opponent of the coup organizers turned out to be Boris
Yeltsin.
The coup organizers could not win enough influence to counter the influence of Boris
Yeltsin in the most important Soviet republic, Russia. Yeltsin used his status as an elected
republican president to establish successfully an alternative source of civilian control for the
Russian military, and the coup organizers stopped their attempt after three days.
The breakdown in Soviet civil-military relations cannot be explained by the decline of
military autonomy or civilian control alone. In fact, the military leadership's separation from
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broader society may have contributed to the coup, and the instruments of subjective civilian
control drove the coup.
Similarly, the coup was not the result of the lack of integration between civilian and
military values and backgrounds. Civilians and soldiers were on both sides of a coup that
reflected the contest of values in the broader society of the Soviet Union.
Citizens in the military, civilian authorities and society as such seriously disagreed
about the political decision-making process and the role and nature of the military. The
concordance approach therefore provides an explanation for the breakdown in Soviet civil-
military relations in 1991.
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